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Preface 
Standard setting is 'one of the most comoniy used regulatory 
tools to limit detrimental effects of technologies on human health, 
safety, and psychological well being. Standards also work as major 
constraints on technological development, particularly in the ener- 
gy field. The trade-offs to be made between economic, engineering, 
environmental, and political objectives, the high uncertainty about 
environmental effects, and the conflicting interests of groups in- 
volved in standard setting make the regulatory task exceedingly 
difficult. 
Realizing this difficulty, the Volkswagenwerk Foundation spon- 
sored a research subtask in IIASA's Energy Systems Program enti- 
tled "Procedures  f o r  t h e  E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  S t a n d a r d s f r .  The objec- 
tives of this research are to analyze existing procedures for 
standard setting and to develop new techniques to improve the re- 
gulatory decision making process. The research performed under 
this project include: 
i) policy analyses of the institutional aspects of stan- 
dard setting and comparisons with other regulatory 
tools; 
ii) case studies of ongoing or past standard setting pro- 
cesses (e.g. oil discharge standards or noise stan- 
dards) ; 
iii) development of formal methods for standard setting 
based on decision and game theory; 
iv) applications of these methods to real world standard 
setting problems. 
The present research memorandum is one in a series of papers 
dealing with the application of game-theoretic methods to stan- 
dard setting. It presents a formal model for the conflict situa- 
tion arising from carbon dioxide pollution. 
iii 

Abstract 
Under the assumption that a continuous increase in atmo- 
spheric carbon dioxide beyond a critical value, caused by the 
combustion of fossil fuel, will lead to irreversible and large 
changes of the climate of the earth, the problem of limiting 
C 0 2  emission becomes an urgent concern. The subject of how to 
determine and adapt an emission standard for carbon dioxide is 
treated as a three-person infinite stage game, the players of 
which are the decision units of regulators, producers, and 
population. After the description of the model solutions are 
derived for several solution concepts and discussed. In special 
cases the solutions differ substantially from each other. 
This  paper was o r i g i n a l l y  prepared under t h e  t i t l e  "Modelling 
f o r  Management" f o r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  a t  a  Nate r  Research Cent re  
(U.K. ) Conference on "River  P o l l u t i o n  Con t ro l " ,  Oxford, 
9 - 1 1  A s r i l ,  1979. 
Dynamic Standard Setting for Carbon Dioxide 
INTRODUCTION 
The emission of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere resulting 
from fossil fuel use has been increasing at an exponential rate 
for more than one century. If this expansion continues, the 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere may be doubled 
in about the next 60 years according to R.M. Rotty, 1977. The 
effects on the global climate may well appear suddenly and could 
get out of control before remedial actions become effective. 
Since easily accessible fossil fuels contain such big amounts 
of carbon there is a strong tendency to use them as a source of 
energy that could last for nearly two more centuries. This is 
much more so since the competing nuclear energy meets increasing 
resistance by citizen groups. But it is the vastness of this 
carbon reserve that causes deep concern within the climatological 
community. The amount of carbon in recoverable fossil reserves 
is ten times the amount now contained as carbon dioxide in the 
entire global atmosphere. 
As these reserves are being used, the concentration of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere will surely increase; and because carbon 
dioxide absorbs a portion of the infrared radiation emitted by 
the earth, it is generally believed that a higher atmospheric 
temperature will result ("greenhouse effect"). Although it is 
uncertain how much warming is produced by a given increase, the 
increased atmospheric carbon dioxide could have a considerable 
impact on man's environment. 
Significant physical effects that may be expected with high 
fossil use are the melting of polar sea ice and/or decreasing 
precipitation in mid-latitude regions. Major socio-political 
impacts could plausibly attend a substantial increase of carbon 
dioxide, for example: 
- large and persistent fluctuations in global food supply, 
due to repeated crop failures in various regions of the 
world which are caused by chronic and severe weather 
variability; 
- increasingly regulated demographic migration between 
regions and across national borders, due to a climate- 
related collapse of selected webs in regional economies; 
shifts in the power balance among nations due to physical 
effects stimulating the economic and cultural decline in 
some regions and stimulating increased growth and pros- 
perity elsewhere. 
At the present time the physical processes causing varia- 
tions of temperature are poorly understood (see J. Williams, 
1978 and T. Augustsson et al., 1977), and changes due to atmo- 
spheric carbon dioxide increases are impossible to detect since 
there is no accurate knowledge of the natural variability of the 
global average temperature. As outlined by O.W. Markley et al., 
1977, and R.M. Rotty, 1977, the other physical and sociopolitical. 
effects are also highly uncertain. 
Although a large part of the climatological community shares 
the opinion that mankind needs and can afford a time window 
between five and ten years for vigorous research and planning in 
order to narrow the uncertainties sufficiently so as to justify 
a major change in energy policies, the model analyzed in this 
paper excludes an increase of relevant knowledge about the physi- 
cal effects. Thus the model deals with the pessimistic view of 
the climatic aspects of carbon dioxide. It is global in charac- 
ter because the global effects seem to dominate the local or 
regional ones. 
Given these substantial uncertainties about the development 
of climate, the problem of what energy policies governments should 
choose, becomes important. This problem is approached as a con- 
flict situation among the groups of governments, producers 
emitting carbon dioxide, and population. In order to work out 
the global aspects this conflict situation has been formalized 
as a multistage three person game, the players of which are 
called regulator, producer, and impactee. Thus we neglect con- 
flicting interests among governments, producers, and different 
groups of populations, such as of developed and developing 
countries. The regulator stands for an international agency, 
the producer for an organization of all producers, and the 
impactee for the community of people possibly affected by the 
carbon dioxide problem. 
The paper is based on the assumption that a continuous in- 
crease of atmospheric carbon dioxide beyond a critical value 
will lead to irreversible and large changes of the climate which 
are regarded as a catastrophe. All three players have their sub- 
jective probability of the level of the critical value. Since, 
by assumption, there is no increase of knowledge about the cli- 
matological process, the regulator can only be concerned about 
the reactions of the producer and especially of the impactee. 
After the specification of the model the results for several 
solution concepts are derived. These are quite different in 
general but can all be interpreted in terms of fair play or power. 
Given that the model allows prescriptive answers although it is 
primarily descriptive. 
Since data are often unknown or scarcely available or arbi- 
trary--as in the case of the regulator where the utility function 
may be conceived of as reflecting a trade-off between the inter- 
ests of producer and impactee--solutions are derived as functions 
of the parameters. Hence parameter analysis can reveal the 
crucial parameters. For the purpose of illustration a small 
numerical example is added. 
THE MODEL 
The conflict situation is described by a three-person dy- 
namic or multistage game in extensive form (see G. Owen, 1968, or 
J.C.C. McKinsey, 1 9 5 2 )  which resembles stochastic qames. At 
each stage a component game of perfect information is played 
which is completely specified by a state. The players' choices 
control not only the payoffs but also the transition probabili- 
ties governing the game to be played at the next stage. Each 
player has his own subjective estimate of the transition proba- 
bility due to his subjective probability of the "true critical 
value". 
The set of states of the game is 
C being the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; 
C the maximal amount of carbon dioxide if all fossil fuel 
is burnt; 
L the upper bound of carbon dioxide emission during a 
period; 
k the critical value for a catastrophe. 
1 1  Let ( C  .L ) denote the first state. Then c1 can be assigned 
the present amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide, and L~ the 
present maximal emission O£-CO or some multiple of it. 2 
The perfect information of the component games is specified 
as follows: 
For state (CIL) the regulator's set of choices is 
where !L denotes the upper bound of the emission of carbon dioxide 
by the producer. 
Then the producer chooses the amount of carbon dioxide to 
be emitted. His set of choices or measures equals 
0 < (3 < 1  is defined below. The impactee's set of measures 
equals 
Knowing the choices R and a he chooses the degree p of the 
pressure he wants to exert on the regulator. p can denote the 
probability of a vote to suspend the government or of an aggres- 
sion against institutions. 
The sets of measures in the case of k, i.e. a catastrophe 
has occureed at amount k of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
eaual 
which means that there is no pressure. 
Given state (C,L) and the choices (R,a,p) the following 
states are possible at the next stage: 
(C + Ba, L) , L (C + Ba, Z) , {k 2 C) . 
The first component of the- first and second states indicates 
that the constant share Ba of emitted carbon dioxide is added to 
the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. This is con- 
sistent with results of box models for the C02 cycle of the earth 
(see R. Avenhaus, et al., 1978) if a is emitted at a constant 
rate during the time period. The estimates for fl range between 
0.01 and 0.5. Amount (1 - B)a is assumed to disappear into the 
biosphere, the upper mixed layer of the sea, and the deep sea. 
The second components express that the old upper bound either 
remains or is reduced by half. It is assumed that there is a 
L probability pv that L is replaced by -Z, where 0 < v < 1 is a 
parameter provided that the catastrophe will not occur. k 2 C 
denotes the amoung of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at which 
the catastrophe occurs. 
All three players are assumed to have subjective probabili- 
ties relating to the critical amount k of carbon dioxide. They 
characterize the transition probabilities. For simplification 
of the model we assume that the subjective probabilities con- 
centrate on points denoted by CP Cp, and CI for regulator, pro- 
ducer, and impactee. We assume CR < Cp, CI < Cp thus allowinq 
the producer to neglect a possible catastrophe. 
The subjective probabilities PR, P p ,  PI for the transition 
from (C,L) to the possible new states are 
I pv if C+BaeR 
or C <C=C+Ba R 
1 if CeR<C+Ba 
0 else 
I 
1 if CeI=CR<C+Ba 
0 else I 
* PI(tI~.~,k.a.p) 
0 if CeI<C+$a 
or CI<C?C+$a 
New state t 
(C+Ba, L) 
1 if CaR=CI<C+ @a 
0 else 
1 if CeI<C+$a 
0 else 
PR(t~,L.k.a,p) 
0 if CeR<C+ga 
or CR<C<C+Ba 
If the inequality ce.<C+Ba holds, player j thinhs that with 
I 
probability 1 catzstrophe C will occur since with the scheduled i 
Pp(t)~.~.k,a.p) 
1 -pv 
emission a the critical threshold is passed. The probability 
for Ci<C<C+Ba is only defined so that the scope of the definition 
J 
covers all possible states and choices. Nevertheless, the proba- 
bility is defined such as to express the idea of player j that 
although C; has turned out as a view too pessimistic, C;<C and 
J J 
any further increase C<C+Ba will result in a catastrophe. From 
the results below it is obvious that the specific definition of 
C~ <C has no consequence. 
State k cannot be changed: Pi(klk,o,o,o) = 1 (j=R,P.I). 
J 
Since no utility functions are known for the three players, we 
start with linear ones which are simplest to assess. Let the 
transition from state s and measures (l,a,p) to state t have the 
utility U.(s; l,a,p,t) for players j=R,P,I. 
I 
The parameters are assumed to have the signs c120t c2>0, 
c3<0, c4>0, c5>0, c6<0. c.(j=R,P,I) is the additional payoff to 
3 
player j due to catastrophe and therefore regarded as largely 
negative. c120 reflects the regulator's internal difficulties 
in setting small standards, c >Of ~ ~ " 0 ,  c5>0 the benefits of 
2 
energy production; c3<0 the damage to the regulator due to 
pressure exerted on him; and c6<0 the burden of organization. 
The term - k-C expresses that energy production is only valuable 0 
up to the critical amount. Thus the idea is excluded that in 
the case of a slowly developing catastrophe energy production by 
combustion of fossil fuel may give additional benefits during 
the initial stages of the catastrophe. 
A play T of the game is given by an infinite sequence 
of states, measures of the regulator, producer, and impactee, 
respectively. According to the list of transition probabiiities, 
there are only sequences where 
4 4 
1 i i 1 L' L' C q, and L E{L t ?, T, . . . )  , 
ci+l i 
-C if s i+l - and ai = i+l i+l B - ( C  t L  - 
m Furthermore if si = k then s = k for m > i. As a first 
approach we define the utility of a play as the undiscounted in- 
finite sum of the transition utilities: 
i Since the summed-up internal utilities Zc,l can become infinite 
'1 1 1  1 
we omit them by specifying cl = 0. Let (s ,1 ,a ,p ,...) denote 
i i i 
a play where s = (C ,L ) and s i+l = k. 

A strategy op of the producer is a map 
such that 
A strategy oI of the impactee is a map 
such that 
The sets of strategies are denoted by Z (j = R,P,I). j 
Due to the list of transition probabilities defined above 
infinitely many plays can occur. The appropriate o-algebra over 
the set II of all possible plays is defined as the minimal o- 
algebra containing all cylinders with finite bases (see M. L O ~ V ~ ,  
1955, 8.3). Due to the theorem of Tulcea there exist probability 
measures P . ( I oR1 op ,oI) on this o-algebra where P.(- lo 
3 3 R f  opt GI) 
stems from the iteration of given subjective probabilities. 
The payoff function to player j is defined as his high sub- 
jective expected utility 
The formalism allows to derive a sharp upper bound for 
V. (oRf up oI) . Due to the definition of the transition proba- 3 m m bility PR the set of plays with a component state sm=(C ,L , 
m 
such that C >CR has probability PR(* ~oRfopfol) = 0. 
1 1  1 1  
Hence only plays TI = (s ,1 ,a ,p ;...) have to be considered 
m m 
where a component state s either equals (C . L ~ )  such that 
m C <CR or CR. Hence 
CR-C 1 
U (TI) = c3 2 Ym+c 2 B + c 
-R R if cieR<ci+~ai , 
1 CR'C 
I n  b o t h  c a s e s  gR(') G c 2  i s  obv ious .  Hence 
I The ana logous  argument  y i e l d s  VI (0,. o p t  o I )  G c5 whereas  
4 I Cp-C 
Ep (71) Q C 4  B immedia te ly  i m p l i c a t e s  
The bounds a r e  s h a r p  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  s t r a t e g y  t r i p l e s  
e x i s t  y i e l d i n g  t h e  bounds a s  p a y o f f s .  
Cp-C I 
Then V R ( o R I o p I o I )  = c4 B 
W e  g i v e  examples f o r  VR and V below. I f  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  P  
t h e  p a y o f f s  a s  e x p e c t e d  p a y o f f s  o v e r  II w e r e  more e l a b o r a t e d  (see 
e . g .  J.  K i n d l e r ,  1971) it would be o b v i o u s  t h a t  w e  a r r i v e  a t  t h e  
same p a y o f f s  V : Z  x  Zp x  ZI -t IR i f  w e  r e p l a c e  t h e  component i R 
u t i l i t y  U I  
T h i s  remark p e r m i t s  t o  s h o r t e n  p r o o f s  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .  
THE GAME-THEORETIC SOLUTION 
Except  f o r  two-person zero-sum games o r  e q u i v a l e n t  games, 
t h e r e  is  no unanimous s o l u t i o n  c o n c e p t .  I n s t e a d  t h e r e  are  a  
v a r i e t y .  T h e r e f o r e  w e  s h a l l  f i r s t  g i v e  b r i e f  d e f i n i t i o n s  bf t h e  
s o l u t i o n  c o n c e p t s  ( f o r  a  b r o a d e r  d i s c u s s i o n  see R. Avenhaus and 
E. HopfingerI1!l78) ,  and l a t e r  on d e s c r i b e  s t r a t e g y  t h r e e - t u p l e s  
s a t i s f y i n g  them. 
+ + +  D e f i n i t i o n :  A t h r e e - t u p l e  ( o R l a p , o I  ) E L  X L  xL1 o f  s t r a t e -  
R P  
g i e s  i s  c a l l e d  a (weak) e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  i f  
D e f i n i t i o n :  The payof f  v e c t o r  ( V . ( o R , o p , a I ) ) j  = R , P , I  is  
3 
c a l l e d  P a r e t o - o p t i m a l  i f  t h e r e  is no o t h e r  payof f  v e c t o r  
( V j  (-rR1 T ~ ,  -r1) ) where . E L .  j = R , P , I )  , such  t h a t  
3 3 
and a t  l e a s t  see i i i ~ q ~ a l i t y  s t r i c t l y  h ~ i d i l l g .  
D e f i n i t i o n :  L e t  ( W R I W p l W I )  cR3 d e n o t e  t h e  p o i n t  o f  maximal 
p o s s i b l e  p a y o f f s  which i s  c a l l e d  b l i s s  p o i n t ,  i . e .  
W = max(V.(oR.op,oI)/oicLi(i = R , P , I ) ) .  The payof f  v e c t o r  j  J 
( V ~ , V ~ , V ~ )  i s  c a l l e d  b l i s s - o p t i m a l  i f  
2 2 
- 1 . )  = min 
3 
o I )  - 1 .  I ( o R l o p , a I )  E L  X L  xC I 
j = R , P , I  
R P  I) 
D e f i n i t i o n :  L e t  ( d R , d p l d I )  b e  a  t r i p l e  o f  p a y o f f s  t h e  
p l a y e r s  o b t a i n  i n  case t h e y  c a n n o t  r e a c h  a n  unanimous agreement  on 
t h e  c h o i c e  of  a  payof f  v e c t o r .  Then t h e  Nash s o l u t i o n  i s  t h e  p o i n t  
( W R , W p , W  ) which maximizes t h e  t e r m  ( u R  - dR)  ( u p  - d p )  ( u I  - d I )  I 
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  u  = V . ( o  a ) ( j  = R , P , I )  f o r  some j J R ~ ~ P ~  I 
s t r a t e g y  t h r e e - t u p l e  and  u  > d  ( j  = R ,  P I  I )  . j -  j 
D e f i n i t i o n :  A h i e r a r c h i c  s o Z u t i o n  i s  a  t r i p l e  
( T R t T p ~ T I  ) c o n s i s t e n t  of  a  s t r a t e g y  T R E C  R'  and two maps 
such  t h a t  v ~ ( O ~ ~ O ~ ~ T ~ ( U ~ ~ U ~ ~  = max v I ( o R t o p l o I l  I 
a I € c  I 
The game h a s  a  huge v a r i e t y  of e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t s .  I n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  w e  g i v e  t h r e e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t s ,  t h e  f i r s t  t w o  o f  
which have Pare to -op t ima l  p a y ~ f f s ~ w h e r e a s  t h e  t h i r d  i s  o n l y  g i v e n  
a s  a n  i n d i c a t o r  o f  t h e  v a r i e t y  of  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t s .  
Theorem: The t u p l e s  of  s t r a t e g i e s  g i v e n  below a r e  e q u i l i b -  
r ium p o i n t s :  
1 1 )  a R  (C,L) :  = min - I 
The i n h e r e n t  u t i l i t i e s  a r e  
1 
C1-C 
0 i f  1 = r n i n ( ~ , -  R ) and  C < cI I i 
a - ( C I S , l , a )  : = I CI -c 
1 if l # m i n ( L I )  o r  c > C, . 
! :  i n h e r e n t  u t i l i t i e s  a r e  
7 ' 
.Yeep q u i e t  p o i n t  
3 3 3  
w i t h  u t i l i t i e s  V .  ( a R I a p I a I )  = 0 ( j = R , P , I )  . 
I 
P r o o f :  I n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  d e s c r i p t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  cumbersome 
-- 
but. n o t  i l l u s t r a t i v e  w e  g i v e  s k e t c h e s  o n l y .  
1 1 1 1 
1 )  I .et  i i { I  , 2 ,  . . . I  b e  d e f i n e d  by C + J 3 ( i R - 1 ) ~  <C < C  +J3i L . R R R 
One can show by i t e r a t i o n  on i t h a t  
due t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  s t r a t e g y .  Hence 
ana logous ly  
1 I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  CR G C I ,  ( C R , L  ) w i l l  be t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  
p l a y  f o r  i = iR + l , i R  + 2 ,  ... a l s o  due t o  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  prob- 
a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  impactee .  However, i f  CR > C I I  c a t a s t r o p h e  CI 
c,-c1 
I 
w i l l  be t h e  f i n a l  s t a t e  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  payoff  c 5  + cI. 
The r e g u l a t o r ' s  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  o b v i o u s l y  
s a t i s f i e d  s i n c e  t h e  s t r a t e g y  t r i p l e  g i v e s  him t h e  maximal pos- 
s i b l e  u t i l i t y .  J u s t  as i s  obv ious ,  t h e r e  i s  no b e t t e r  payoff  
f o r  t h e  p roducer  w i t h  a n o t h e r  s t r a t e g y ,  and t h i s  i s  a l s o  t r u e  f o r  
t h e  impactee  i n  t h e  c a s e  of CR < CI.  
Only CR > CI r e q u i r e s  more s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .  L e t  a; d e n o t e  a  
d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g y  of  t h e  impactee .  Then a  p l a y  n  w i t h  l i m  ci 5 
- 
i C I  i s  o n l y  p o s s i b l e  i f  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  L~ t o  i t s  h a l f  t a k e s  
p l a c e  an  i n f i n i t e  number of t i m e s .  But t h e n  U ( n )  =.. < 
1 -1,r C,-C 1 
I 
C5 B + c I .  I f  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  of  L '  t a k e s  p l a c e  o n l y  a  f i n i t e  cl-CI 
number of t i m e s  t h e n  U (n)  2 c5 + c I .  Hence sny o t h e r  
-I, r 
s t r a t e g y  canno t  y i e l d  a  b e t t e r  p a y o f f .  
2 )  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  C i CR I t h e  r e g u l a t o r  c a n  o n l y  g e t  a  b e t t e r  i i payoff  i f  p l a y s  n w i t h  s t a t e s  ( C  ,L ) where ci > C, o c c u r  w i t h  a 
' 2 i i  
s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  g r e a t e r  t h a n  z e r o .  S u t  t h e n  aI (C ,L , l , a ) =  
= 7 i n f i n i t e l y  o f t e n  y i e l d i n g  t h e  payoff  -m t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r .  
Thus he  canno t  g e t  a b e t t e r  payoff  w i t h  a d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g y .  
Obviously t h e  p roducer  canno t  g e t  a  b e t t e r  p a y o f f ,  whereas t h e  
impactee  g e t s  h i s  maximal p a y o f f .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  of  C I  = CR r e g u l a t o r  and impactee  r e c e i v e  t h e i r  
maximal p a y o f f s ,  whereas t h e  producer  h a s  no b e t t e r  r e s p o n s e .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  of  CI CR t h e  r e g u l a t o r  may want t o  e s c a p e  c a t a s t r o -  
phe by a p p l y i n g  a  s t r a t e g y  l i k e  t h e  one of  t h e  f i r s t  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o i n t .  But t h e n  h e  i s  punished an  i n f i n i t e  number of  t i m e s  by 
p r e s s u r e  from t h e  impactee  and g e t s  a  smaller p a y o f f .  Again it 
i s  obvious  t h a t  p roducer  and impactee  canno t  do b e t t e r .  
3 )  The i m p a c t e e ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  e x e r t  p r e s s u r e  i n f i n i t e l y  o f t e n  
3 3 3  
a g a i n  makes t h e  s t r a t e g y  t r i p l e  ( a R , o p , a I )  an  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t .  
The q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s :  Which of  t h e s e  e . q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t s  y i e l d  
Pare to -op t ima l  p a y o f f s ?  The answer c a n  immedia te ly  be deduced 
from t h e  fol lowi.ng:  
Theorem: The set of payoffs 
1 (v~(a~lopluI) fvp(~R~op,OI) ,VI(uR,up,oI)) ! C J . ~ Z .  3 3 (j=R,p,I) 
3 is a subset of the following domain D ~ I R  - . 
3 1 )  Let CR < CI < Cp. Then D consists of all (x,y,z) EIR such 
that a pair (pR,pI ) of real numbers exists such that o - ( pR, 
o 2 pI, 0 < pR + pI and the following inequalities hold: 
3 2) Let cR = CI < Cp. Then D consists of all (x,y,z) EIR which 
I, 
are part of a solution (xly,z,p)~IRqof the following system of 
inequallt lss : 
3 3) Let CI < CR < Cp. Then D consists of all (x,y,z)~IR which 
C 
are part of a solution (x,y,z,pIpR ) EIR' of the following system 
of inequalities: 
Sketched p r o o f :  L e t  ( C I ~ , ~ ~ , ~ ~ )  d e n o t e  a  s t r a t e g y  t r i p l e .  I n  
t h e  c a s e  of CR < CI < Cp l e t  pR d e n o t e  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  ( P ~ ( T ~ I u ~ , " ~ , ~ ~ )  
- 
t h a t  a  p l a y  w i t h  s ta tes  (ci,Li) , ci 5 CR w i l l  be r e a l i z e d ,  i .e .  
1 1 1 1  i TR i s  t h e  set o f  a l l  p l a y s  (s ,1 , a  , p  ,... ) such  t h a t  C 5 - CR f o r  
a l l  compoaent s t a t e s  (cl,L1) (i = 1 , 2 , .  . . . L e t  p, = Pp !TI 1 o R . ~ p , a I )  
' i l  deno te  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  set of  p l a y s  (s i , l i ,a  , p  ) (i = 1 , 2 , .  . . I  
- - - 
i i i 
s u c h t h a t  ci 5 CI f o r  a l l  i, where s = (C , L  ) ( i =  1 , 2  ,... ) b u t  
C' > CR f o r  a t  l e a s t  one j .  Obviously 
By d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  t r a n s i t i o n  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  
P R ( T R I ~ R , ~ p f ~ I )  = pRf  b u t  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t y  1  - pR t h e  c a t a s t r o p h e  
w i l l  o c c u r .  Hence 
The i m p a c t e e ' s  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  f o r  p l a y s  w i t h  o n l y  s t a t e  com- 
p o n e n t s  below CR, and between CR and CI a r e  pR and pI r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Theref  o r e  
The p r o o f s  f o r  t h e  two remaining c a s e s  f o l l o w  t h e  same l i n e  o f  
a rgumenta t ion .  One h a s  o n l y  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  p  is  t h e  p r o d u c e r ' s  
i 
s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  a  p l a y  w i l l  o c c u r  where C < CR = CI 
f o r  a l l  component s t a t e s  c ~ .  I n  t h e  l a s t  c a s e  pI d e n o t e s  t h e  
p r o d u c e r ' s  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  a  p l ay  w i t h  component s t a t e s  n o t  
g r e a t e r  t h a t  CI,pR, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  a  p l a y  w i t h  a  component 
s t a t e  g r e a t e r  t h a n  C I ,  and a l l  component s t a t e s  n o t  g r e a t e r  t h a n  
C~ ' 
C o r o l l a r y :  The f i r s t  and t h e  second e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  o f  
t h e  l a s t  b u t  one  theorem have Pare to -op t imal  payoff  v e c t o r s .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  of  CR > c1 and CI - > c1 t h e  keep-ouie t  p o i n t   has no 
Pare to -op t imal  payoff  v e c t o r .  
P roof :  Having chosen e i t h e r  pI = 1 o r  pR = 1 and p  = 1 ,  i m -  
m e d i a t e l y  v e r i f i e s  t h a t  t h e  payoff  v e c t o r s  of  t h e  f i r s t  and sec -  
ond e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t s  be long t o  t h e  boundary p l a n e  g iven  on t h e  
r igh t -hand  s i d e  o f  t h e  i n e q u a l i t i e s  of  t h e  l a s t  b u t  one theorem. 
Hence t h e  payoff  v e c t o r s  a r e  Pare to -op t imal .  
Under t h e  g i v e n  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  keep-quie t  p o i n t  i s  dominated 
by t h e  f i r s t  or  t h e  second e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t .  The r e s u l t s  a r e  
i l l u s t r a t e d  by F i g u r e s  1  and 2 showing t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  of  s u b s e t  
D of t h e  l a s t  theorem. 
A s  can  be s een  from t h e  f i , g u r e s  even t h e  combined s o l u t i o n  
c o n c e p t s  of  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  and P a r e t o - o p t i n a l i t y  do n o t  y i e l d  
a n  unanimous s o l u t i o n .  But what abou t  t h e  remaining s o l u t i o n  
c o n c e p t s ?  I n  o r d e r  t o  d i s c u s s  them w e  g i v e  t h e  boundary p l a n e  
o f  t h e  l a s t  theorem a f t e r  e l i m i n a t i o n  of  t h e  pa ramete r s  f o r ' t h e  
c a s e  of CR < C I  < Cp by t h e  fo l l owing  e q u a t i o n :  
P -r Y 2 cp-cI x -R -1 '5 CR-cI Cp-iI ) 
-- + - 
I3 +c\ B R R + - = c o n s t a n t  . R C I 
S inc e  by assumption cI and cR a r e  huge n e g a t i v e  numbers t h e  
e q u a t i o n  i s  dominated b  t e rm -. Hence t h e  payoff 
cR-cl cR-' C 4  
v e c t o r  (C2 
, c4 ''5 4 ) i s  e i t h e r  b l i s s - o p t i m a l  o r  ve ry  
c l o s e  t o  t h e  b l i s s - o p t i m a l  payoff  v e c t o r .  Hence w e  can r e g a r d  it 
a s  approx imate ly  b l i s s - o p t i m a l .  
The same holds f o r  CR1 = CI < Cp, and i n  t h e  c a s e  of  CI  : CR < 
C1-C 1 C1-C C1-c1 
< Cp f o r  ( c 2  B I C 4  4 I C 5  6 ) *  
Without proof we s t a t e  t h a t  t h e  two approximate  b l i s s - o p t i -  
ma1 p o i n t s  a r e  Nash s o l u t i o n s  f o r  d i  = o  ( j  = R , P , I )  a s  soon 
J 
a s  t h e  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e s  of c I  and c R  a r e  l a r g e  enough. T h i s  means 
t h a t  t h e  b l i s s - p o i n t  concep t  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  Nash s o l u t i o n  f a v o r  
a  behav ior  based on t h e  most p e s s i m i s t i c  e s t i m a t e  min ( C R , C I )  of 
t h e  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e .  
Figure 1. Payoff diagram for regulator and impactee (CR < CI). 
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Figure 2. Payoff diagram for regulator and impactee (CR > CI). 
The h i e r a r c h i c  s o l u t i o n  c o n c e p t  i s  much more c o m p l i c a t e d  
t h a n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  o n e s  s i n c e  it i n v o l v e s  maps from s t r a t e g y  
s p a c e s  i n t o  s t r a t e g y  s p a c e s .  W e  c i r c u m v e n t  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  
o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem s p e c i f y i n g  o n l y  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  s t r a t e g i e s .  
1 1 1  Theorem: L e t  ( u R , a p , u I )  b e  t h e  f i r s t  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  of  
' ;-(L l a s t  b u t  o n e  theorem,  i.  e. , 
I 
o ~ ( c , L )  = min n C ~ - C ) )  ; 
( T  1  ' , T:) d e n o t e  a  h i e r a r c h i c  s o l u t i o n .  Then ( T ~ ~  T~~ T ~ )  li ' I- P 
d e f i n e d  by 
i s  a l s o  a  h i e r a r c h i c  s o l u t i o n .  
1 1 1  1 1  1 1 1 1  P r o o f :  vI  ( u R l a p , a I )  = max V ( a R , a p , a  ) s i n c e  ( o R t o p , a  ) i s  
O I  
I I I 
a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t .  The n e x t  s t e p - i s  t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o f  
1 1 1  ' 1 1 Vp ( ~ R . u p l u I ~  = ma* Vp ( J R . u p , ~ I  ( u R l  opl) . The r e g u l a t o r ' s  s t r a t e g y  
O P  
I 
a  p r e v e n t s  a  l a r g e r  amount t h a n  C o f  c a r b o n  d i o x i d e  i n  t h e  R R 
a t m o s p h e r e ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  p r o d u c e r ' s  u t i l i t y  i s  t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  more 
1 1 1  cR-cl  d i o x i d e  i s  i n  t h e  a tmosphe re .  T h e r e f o r e  Vp(oR,up ,u I )  
= C 4  B - 1 
= max V p ( o ~ , o p , o I ) ,  which i s  even  s t r o n g e r .  The l a s t  c o n d i t i o n  
" A "  I I i s  t r i v i a l l y  s a t i s f i e d  s i n c e  VR ( a R l  u;, u I )  g i v e s  t h e  maximal pos-  
c--c1 
K 
s i b l e  u t i l i t y  c2 B t o  t h e  r e g u l a t o r .  
I t  shcu ld  be remarked t h a t  t h e  theorem i s  independent  o f  
whether  Ck < CI o r  n o t .  I t  s imply  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t o r  i s  
s t r o n g  enough t o  push th rough  h i s  s t a n d p o i n t .  
The f o l l o w i n g  example s e r v e s  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  o r d e r  o f  mag- 
1  16 16 1  16 
n i t u d e .  Le t  C = 6  10 g ,  C = 18 10 g ,  L  = 0.2 10 g ,  
I - 4  1  f3 = 0.3,  c 2  = 0.002$/gf c4 = 10 c2,  c5 = 0.7 c2. C i s  i n  t h e  
o r d e r  of  magnitude of  t h e  p r e s e n t  amount of  carbon d i o x i d e  i n  
t h e  atmosphere,  and L' i n  t h e  o r d e r  of magnitude o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  
r e l e a s e  o f  ca rbon  d i o x i d e .  $3.6 1012 is  a n  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
g r o s s  world p r o d u c t  of  1970. Then p roduc t i on  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  200 1 4  
y e a r s  and t h e  payoff  v e c t o r  e q u a l s  ($8 1014,  $8 101 0 ,  $5.6 10 ) . 
CONCLUSION 
The game h a s  been analyzed f o r  d i f f e r e n t  s o l u t i o n  concep t s .  
I t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  Nash s o l u t i o n  and t h e  b l i s s - o p t i m a l  concep t  
y i e l d  s o l u t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  b a s i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  h i e r a r c h i c  
s o l u t i o n .  I n  t h e  c a s e  of  CI < CR where t h e  impac t ee ' s  view 'is 
more p e s s i m i s t i c  t h a n  t h a t  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r ,  t h e  Nash s o l u t i o n  
and t h e  bl iss-optimum concep t ,  by t h e i r  tendency t o  f a i r  b a r g a i n s ,  
f a v o r  t h e  second e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t  based on t h e  e s t i m a t e  CI.  
Cont ra ry  t o  t h i s  t h e  h i e r a r c h i c  s o l u t i o n  y i e l d s  t h e  f i r s t  equ i -  
l i b r i u m  p o i n t  which i s  based o n  t h e  e s t i m a t e  CR a s  c r i t i c a l  v a l u e .  
The r e s u l t s  h e a v i l y  depend on t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  summed up 
component p a y o f f s  a r e  n o t  d i s coun t ed .  Thus t h e  impactee  can  
p r i n c i p a l l y  push t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  payoff  down t o  minus i n f i n i t y .  
A c t u a l l y  he  canno t  e x e r t  p r e s s u r e  i n f i n i t e l y  o f t e n  s i n c e  t h e n  he  
would a l s o  r e c e i v e  t h e  payoff  minus i n f i n i t y .  Hence t h i s  cap- 
a b i l i t y  t o  p u n i sh  o r  t o  e x e r t  p r e s s u r e  o n l y  y i e l d s  a  v a s t n e s s  of  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p o i n t s .  I t  seems t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  may change sub- 
s t a n t i a l l y  i f  d i s c o u n t i n g  is  i n c luded .  Then t h e  r e g u l a t o r  may be 
a b l e  t o  resist p r e s s u r e ,  and on t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  t h e  impac tee  may 
be a b l e  t o  a f f o r d  p r e s s u r e .  Another way would be t o  assume t h e  
game t o  be s topped  a s  soon a s  t h e  upper  bound L  i s  below a  g ive n  
l i m i t ,  e . g . ,  i f  L  i s  less t h a n  t e n  p e r c e n t  of  t h e  ca rbon  d i o x i d e  
produced by t h e  b i o sp h e re  d u r i n g  one  y e a r .  Again t h e  q u e s t i o n  
a r i s e s  whether  t h e  impactee  can  e n f o r c e  a  t o t a l  r e l e a s e  t h a t  is 
C1-C 1  
less t h a n  B e  
So f a r  t h e  impactee  h a s  been r e p r e s e n t e d  a s  a  r a t i o n a l  
p l a y e r  w i t h  a  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  Another p o s s i b i l i t y  would be t o  
r e p r e s e n t  him by a  response  f u n c t i o n  based on h i s  p e r c e p t i o n  of 
t h e  r e g u l a t o r ' s  and t h e  p r o d u c e r ' s  d e c i s i o n s ,  i . e . ,  t o  p r e s c r i b e  
one  s t r a t e g y  of  t h e  impactee.  Then w e  would a c t u a l l y  have a  
r e g u l a to r - p r o d u ce r  game, and a s  s o l t u i o n  concept  w e  might  t a k e  
t h e  h i e r a r c h i c  s o l u t i o n .  But which r e sponse  should  w e  u s e ?  
Our a n a l y s i s  of t h e  th ree -person  game o f f e r s  u s  two r e sponse s :  
I f  we assume t h e  f i r s t ,  then  t h e  impactee is  a c t u a l l y  a dummy 
p l a y e r .  Then equ i l ib r ium po in t  one is  p a r t  of  t h e  h i e r a r c h i c  so- 
l u t i o n .  - I n  t h e  c a s e  of o2 however, t h e  h i e r a r c h i c  s o l u t i o n  y i e l d s  I 
t h e  second equ i l ib r ium p o i n t  a s  can be v e r i f i e d  ve ry  e a s i l y .  
Thus, t h e  three-person game can provide f o r  i d e a s  how t o  formal ize  
a response func t ion .  
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